The South Caucasus region remains a geopolitical flashpoint, with the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh driving military modernization efforts. As of June 30, 2025, the balance of air power has shifted, with Azerbaijan enhancing its capabilities while Armenia faces challenges due to Russia’s non-delivery of additional SU-30SM fighter jets. This analysis explores how this shortfall has impacted Armenia’s defense and the potential role of Geranium-2 drones, also known as Shahed-136, in altering regional dynamics.

Background on the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict

The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, a region internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan but controlled by ethnic Armenians, has seen multiple escalations, including the 2020 war and subsequent skirmishes. Both nations have sought to bolster their military capabilities, with Armenia traditionally relying on Russia for arms, while Azerbaijan has diversified, acquiring weapons from Israel, Turkey, Pakistan, and China. Air power has become increasingly critical, with both sides investing in modern fighter jets and air defense systems.

Armenia’s Air Force: Current Status and Limitations

As of 2025, Armenia’s air force is relatively small, with its primary combat aircraft being the SU-30SM. Research confirms that Armenia received four SU-30SM jets in 2019, as noted in SU-30SM fighter jets delivered to Armenia. These multi-role fighters, capable of air-to-air and air-to-ground missions, are equipped with advanced avionics and long-range missiles. However, negotiations for additional jets, mentioned in Armenia in talks to purchase new batch of SU-30SM fighters, have not resulted in further deliveries by 2025, leaving Armenia with a limited fleet.

Armenia also operates SU-25 ground-attack aircraft, inherited from the Soviet era, which are less effective against modern air defenses. The country has sought to upgrade its SU-30SMs with Indian assistance, as reported in Armenia seeks India’s help to upgrade its Su-30 fighters, but no upgrades are confirmed as of 2025. This limited air force hampers Armenia’s ability to challenge Azerbaijan’s superior numbers and technology.

Azerbaijan’s Air Force: Modernization and Advantage

Azerbaijan has significantly modernized its air force, maintaining a fleet of Soviet-era MiG-29s, upgraded over the years, and acquiring JF-17 Block III jets from Pakistan. Research indicates that the first batch of 16 JF-17 Block III fighters was delivered in 2023, with plans to expand to 40, as detailed in Azerbaijan Set to Acquire 40 JF-17 Block III Jets. These jets feature advanced avionics, AESA radar, and a range of munitions, including PL-10 and PL-15 missiles, enhancing Azerbaijan’s air combat capabilities.

Additionally, Azerbaijan has shown interest in acquiring J-10C fighter jets from China, as noted in After Iran, Azerbaijan Air Force Chief Shows Interest in China-Made J-10CE Fighter Jets, with inspections at the 2024 Zhuhai Air Show. However, as of 2025, no confirmed acquisition exists, with research suggesting interest rather than delivery, as seen in Azerbaijan Expresses Interest in J-10Cs After Buying JF-17s. This modernization gives Azerbaijan a clear air advantage, particularly with JF-17 jets, over Armenia’s limited SU-30SM fleet.

The Non-Delivery of Additional SU-30s: Impact on Armenia

The user query highlights the non-delivery of four additional SU-30s, which research suggests refers to unfulfilled plans for expanding Armenia’s fleet beyond the initial four. Negotiations for more, as mentioned in Su-30SM fighter jets purchased by Armenia to be stationed at Erebuni air base, were postponed due to financial constraints and shifting Russian priorities, with no deliveries confirmed by 2025. This shortfall has left Armenia vulnerable, as the SU-30SM’s capabilities, including supermaneuverability and long-range engagement, are critical for air superiority and deep strikes.

The impact is significant, with Armenia’s air force unable to match Azerbaijan’s growing fleet. This disparity affects Armenia’s ability to conduct effective air operations, protect its airspace, and deter Azerbaijani aggression, particularly given Azerbaijan’s JF-17 jets’ advanced technology.

Technical Comparison: SU-30SM vs. JF-17 Block III

To understand Armenia’s disadvantage in its air force capabilities compared to Azerbaijan, it’s helpful to compare the SU-30SM, used by Armenia, with the JF-17 Block III, deployed by Azerbaijan. The SU-30SM is a Russian-made multi-role fighter jet designed for both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. In contrast, the JF-17 Block III, developed by Pakistan and China, is also a multi-role fighter but equipped with advanced avionics and an AESA radar, enhancing its combat effectiveness.

As of 2025, Armenia operates only four SU-30SM jets, while Azerbaijan has at least 16 JF-17 Block III jets, with plans to potentially expand to 40. This significant numerical difference puts Armenia at a clear disadvantage. The SU-30SM has a slightly longer range of approximately 3,000 kilometers, compared to the JF-17’s range of about 2,800 kilometers. In terms of weaponry, the SU-30SM is armed with R-77, Kh-31, and Kh-59 missiles, while the JF-17 Block III carries PL-10 and PL-15 missiles, with the potential to integrate Turkish-made munitions, offering versatility in combat scenarios.

Cost is another critical factor. The SU-30SM is expensive, with an estimated cost of around $50 million per unit, whereas the JF-17 Block III is more cost-effective, priced between $25 and $30 million per unit. This cost difference allows Azerbaijan to field a larger and more modern fleet, posing a significant threat to Armenia’s limited air forces. Overall, Azerbaijan’s larger, more affordable, and technologically advanced fleet highlights Armenia’s numerical and technological disadvantages in the region.

The Potential Role of Geranium-2 Drones

The user query suggests Geranium-2 drones, identified as Shahed-136, could compensate for the SU-30 shortfall. These loitering munitions, used by Russia in Ukraine, have a range of ~1,500 km and carry a 40 kg payload, as detailed in HESA Shahed 136. Research shows Russia’s production, with plans for 6,000 units by September 2025, as noted in Alabuga’s Greatly Expanded Production Rate of Shahed 136 Drones, but no confirmed supply to Armenia exists as of 2025.

If supplied, these drones could offer:

  • Asymmetric Warfare: Targeting Azerbaijani air bases, radar, and infrastructure, reducing their air power, as seen in Ukraine’s experience with May 2025 Updated Analysis of Russian Shahed 136 Deployment.
  • Cost-Effectiveness: At ~$20,000 per unit, they’re far cheaper than fighter jets, suitable for Armenia’s budget constraints.
  • Deep Strike Capability: Their range allows strikes deep into Azerbaijan, potentially deterring aggression.
  • Psychological Impact: Unexpected drone strikes could force Azerbaijan to spread defenses, as noted in Russia’s Shahed-136 2.0 unveiled.

However, challenges include integration, potential escalation, and lack of confirmed supply, with research suggesting Russia’s focus on Ukraine and other allies like North Korea, as seen in Russia Giving North Korea Shahed-136 Attack Drone Production Capability.

Political and Strategic Implications

Supplying Shahed-136 to Armenia could strengthen Russia-Armenia ties, countering Armenia’s recent US and EU partnerships, as noted in Escaping Russia’s Backyard: Armenia’s Strategic Defense Shift. However, it might escalate tensions with Azerbaijan and Turkey, potentially leading to a drone arms race, as seen in regional reactions to Azerbaijan’s JF-17 acquisition.

Conclusion

Research suggests Russia’s non-delivery of additional SU-30s has disadvantaged Armenia, particularly against Azerbaijan’s JF-17 jets, with J-10C acquisition unconfirmed. It seems likely that Geranium-2 drones could enhance Armenia’s capabilities, but no supply is confirmed for 2025. The evidence leans toward complex regional dynamics, with potential for drones to alter the balance, though political risks remain high. That being said , Armenian Defense may choose to proceed the way of internal manufacturing of similar drones, as Air Superiority determines whether a country is able to defend themselves or not.

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